We study the sin taxes and regulatory measures that it is optimal to implement when consumers are time-inconsistent and there are inefficiencies associated with the use of either instrument. For high inefficiency of regulation, only taxation is used and it may be higher or lower than the first-best depending on the price elasticity of demand. For high inefficiency of taxation, only regulation is used to an extent which depends on its effectiveness in terms of quantity reduction relative to the disutility it generates. For moderate inefficiency of either instrument, taxation and regulation are both optimally used. JEL Classification: D03, H21, L51.
net revenue collection for US, with a median of about 1% for OECD countries (2011). As for compliance costs, a study by Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2015) for 189 countries across the world reports that the number of hours spent to comply for consumption tax (sales and VAT) amounts on average to 99 hours, with 55 and 60 hours for EU-EFTA and North-America area respectively. 1 Besides taxation, the government can try and a¤ect directly and/or indirectly the demand of sin goods through regulatory measures. Bans on junk food, smoking bans, bans on alcohol purchase or on gambling are only but few examples of regulation of consumption widely used in many countries that have proven to be an e¤ective means of a¤ecting the consumption of sin goods. 2 Despite the widespread policy makers' reliance on both such measures, the economic literature has not investigated so far the joint impact of tax and regulatory measures on the consumption of sin goods.
We incorporate the ine¢ ciencies associated to taxation in a model in which the consumption choice of identical agents with self-control problems may be a¤ected also by regulatory measures.
We focus on a simple quasi-linear economy in which, in addition to a composite good, there is 1 Strictly speaking, consumption taxes compliance costs are incurred by …rms. They nevertheless represent a burden for the system that ultimately impacts on prices and undermines e¢ ciency. For an extensive survey of the literature on the relevance of tax operating costs, see Evans (2003) . 2 An ample description of some regulatory measures and of the literature testing their e¤ectiveness is provided in the next section. a sin good. Regulatory measures a¤ect the agents' utility through a reduction in the actual immediate bene…t from consuming the sin good. In some cases this reduction is high. For example, clean air regulations, by restricting the choice freedom and constraining addicted consumers to smoke in uncomfortable situations (e.g., out in the cold), may generate a large disutility. Similarly, bans on fatty food such as crisps in schools, by obliging to postpone consumption, impose a signi…cant reduction in the utility from fatty food consumption. In other cases, this utility-reduction e¤ect is low. An example is given by warning labels on tobacco, alcohol or fatty food.
Within this setting, the paper analyzes three di¤erent cases. Those in which each instrument, taxation and regulation, is used in isolation, dealt with in Sections 4 and 5, respectively, and the case in which the two instruments are jointly used, dealt with in Section 6.
When only taxation is used, our …rst result is that the optimal tax is positive, provided the ine¢ ciency associated with it is not too large. Moreover, it may be higher or lower than the …rst-best-where the …rst-best taxation is the level that induces the agent to consume the …rst-best level of the sin good-depending on the price elasticity of demand. Finally, the degree of ine¢ ciency of taxation a¤ects the extent to which taxation is driven away from its …rst-best level. In particular, the higher the ine¢ ciency, the higher the distortion.
The intuition for taxation exceeding the …rst-best level despite the ine¢ ciency associated with it is the following. Taxing the sin good reduces its demand and, through the lumpsum transfer from the tax proceeds, increases the demand of the numeraire. However, such increase is mitigated or even o¤set by the leakage of resources implied by the ine¢ ciency of the tax system. This leakage of resources, and the subsequent reduction in the consumption of the numeraire, represents the cost of the tax measure. This cost may increase or decrease with taxation depending on the elasticity of demand. When the elasticity is high, an increase in taxation implies a reduction in the consumption of the sin good (quantity e¤ect) that is su¢ ciently large to mitigate the deadweight loss implied by the extra-expenditure driven by the tax increase. Thus, to mitigate its ine¢ ciency, taxation is set above the …rst-best. Conversely, when the elasticity is low, an increase in taxation implies a reduction in the consumption of the sin good that is small relative to the extra-expenditure implied by the tax increase. To mitigate such negative e¤ect, it is best not to increase the tax and set it below the …rst-best. In other words, decreasing taxation generates an increase in the consumption of the sin good that is nevertheless small relative to the saving (in the deadweight loss) implied by the tax decrease.
While the result just described shows that the direction of the distortion due to taxation (with respect to the …rst-best) depends on the elasticity of demand, the extent to which taxation is driven away from its …rst-best level depends on the degree of ine¢ ciency of taxation. More speci…cally, the higher the ine¢ ciency, the higher the leakage of resources following a tax increase, the larger the upward (or downward) distortion in taxation that is needed to compensate it.
To determine whether it is optimal to regulate the consumption of the sin good, we compare the relative ine¢ ciency of the regulatory instrument with the internality that it aims to correct.
Similar to the case with taxation, we …nd that regulation is optimal, when it is the only instrument (Section 5), as long as its ine¢ ciency, i.e., the disutility it generates, is not too high. In addition, the extent to which it is relied upon relative to the …rst-best-where the …rst-best regulation is the level that induces the agent to consume the …rst-best level of the sin good-depends on whether the positive e¤ect of regulation in terms of quantity reduction is large (small) with respect to the negative one induced by the loss in utility.
When both instruments are available, the problem becomes one of choosing a control scheme so as to minimize the total social costs, these being the sum of the ine¢ ciency of taxation and the disutility on consumption implied by regulation. In particular, when the ine¢ ciency of taxation is low (high) relative to the ine¢ ciency of regulation, taxation (regulation) is preferred. When the ine¢ ciency associated with both instruments is not too high, both instruments are used. This is because the social cost of using taxation and regulation together are convex. All the previous results and some further ones are illustrated either through parametrical or numerical examples.
A last remark is in order. In real world, there may be other than purely e¢ ciency-based reasons for favouring either tax or regulation as control instruments. As argued by Weitzman (1974, p. 479) , "these reasons might involve ideological, political, legal, social, historical, administrative, motivational, informational, monitoring, enforcing, or other considerations. But there is little of what might be called a system-free character."Thus, our model aims at providing a normative, rather than a positive theory of taxing and regulating vices. We will come back to this point in the concluding discussion.
The paper is related to the literature on time-inconsistency and hyperbolic discounting (Ainslee, 1992). Time-inconsistency has been recently applied in the context of savings decisions (Laibson, 1996; Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman, 1998 ; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), retirement decisions (Diamond and Koszegi, 2003) , and economic growth (Barro, 1999) . Other papers have studied the welfare e¤ects of sin taxes (Gruber and Koszegi, 2001, 2004; Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005) .
The paper is also related to the literature on externality. Starting from the seminal contribution of Weitzman (1974) , this literature has investigated whether price or quantity instruments should be used to correct the externalities. In a setting of imperfect information, the use of both instruments, by a¤ecting the schedule of revenues of the …rms, is shown to provide higher expected welfare gains than an approach relying on either policy instrument alone. The intuition is that, because of uncertainty, one instrument "can protect against the failings of the other" (Roberts and Spence, 1976) . In our setting, the instruments used by the regulator a¤ect the social cost of regulation and taxation and they are jointly used so as to elicit an optimal response by consumers in terms of reduced consumption of the sin good. This is due to the convexity of the social cost in the use of the two instruments.
In the real world, both taxation and regulation have been extensively used to correct the externalities and the internalities associated to the consumption of sin goods. As regards taxation, there is ample evidence that the actual level of taxation exceeds what would be justi…ed by the correction of the externality they create (Chaloupka and Warner, 1998; Evans et al., 1999a,b; Gruber, 2001) . Similarly, there are examples of regulatory measures showing that these measures are mainly devoted to correct internalities rather than externalities, like education initiatives. This will be dealt with in the next section.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some motivating evidence on the regulation of sin goods. In Section 3, we set up the model. In Section 4, we consider the case in which only taxation can be used, while in Section 5 we focus on the case in which only regulation can be used. In Section 6, we consider the case in which both instruments can be used. In the last section we provide some concluding remarks and discuss the normative implications of the model. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
Evidence on regulation of sin goods
Everyday life provides us with several examples of initiatives aimed at forbidding, limiting or deterring the consumption of sin goods. These initiatives can be categorized into two groups: educational initiatives, aimed at increasing the awareness of the health e¤ects of the consumption of sin goods, and policy initiatives, aimed at directly limiting the availability and provision of sin goods.
Education initiatives, like information/awareness campaigns (mass media campaigns, social marketing), are widespreadly used. In many countries, for example, health warning labels, often mandatory, appear on fatty food, tobacco or alcohol products pointing to the health risks associated with their consumption. In some cases they can take the form of recommendations, like in responsible drinking campaigns to prevent alcoholism or drunk driving. Recommendations to moderate/responsible consumption also close advertisements campaigns of alcohol products and gambling (e.g., gamble responsibly). On the packaging of cigarettes and other tobacco products appear a variety of textual and pictorial warnings covering, within a black frame, a large part of the surface of the pack and concerning the health e¤ects of tobacco products consumption. For fatty food, some countries (e.g., UK) have developed a system of front of pack nutritional labels that associates colors with information on fat, salt, sugar, and calories contained in food products, to help people making healthier choices. Those warnings, especially pictorial ones, may have an emotional impact, thus altering the pleasure that one may get from the act of consumption and subtly in ‡uencing choice.
Education initiatives seem to be e¤ective in increasing the consumers' knowledge and attitude about the health consequences of the consumption of sin goods. For tobacco and alcohol products, for example, comprehensive review studies have provided evidence showing the e¤ectiveness of strategies and interventions aimed at preventing smoking uptakes (Thomas et al., 2013) or alcohol related problems (Babor et al., 2003) . Although much more limited, some evidence is also available for food products. For example, a study by Cio¢ et al. (2015) has shown that the introduction of food labels on a sample of pre-packaged food items results in a reduction of the average calories purchased from the labelled foods.
Besides education initiatives, governments rely on several policy initiatives aimed at altering the availability and provision of the good. Examples are bans on fatty food in schools cafeteria, clean-air regulations for tobacco products, alcohol consumption regulations placing controls on the type of alcohol available, on the quantity, or on the days and hours of sale, vending machines and point-of-sale restrictions for tobacco or alcohol products, gambling regulations restrictions on the number of gambling venues, location, and hours of operation.
The idea behind these measures is that the di¢ culty of accessing a good may generate such a high disutility on consumption to induce a reduction of the same. There is ample evidence that this is indeed the case. that restricting gambling availability, by lowering its incidence, can reduce problem gambling. 4 As regards food products, while there are some recent examples of health related food taxes (i.e., taxes on food items that are considered unhealthy) being levied in some countries, 5 the evidence on regulatory measures being put in place and the e¤ectiveness of such measures is rather limited (Datar and Nicosia, 2012).
The Model
We consider a model in which consumers have quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Their intertemporal utility is given by
where u is the instantaneous utility function, is the discount factor, which we assume to be one for simplicity, and 2 ( ; 1], with > 0, is the preference for immediate grati…cation.
The instantaneous utility function is quasi-linear with respect to the sin good (x) and a composite good which acts as a numeraire (z). The sin good increases the consumer's current utility, but reduces future utility, because it creates health damages. Speci…cally,
The function v represents the immediate bene…t from current sin good consumption and satis…es Inada conditions. The function c represents the negative health consequences from past sin good consumption and is such that c x > 0, c xx > 0, and c x (x) = 0 when x = 0. 6 Additive separability of the bene…ts and costs of consumption implies that the individual faces a series of independent decisions. In particular, at any period the consumer maximizes . 5 Taxes of this type have been recently introduced in a number of countries, like Finland, France, Hungary, and Mexico. 6 Those assumptions guarantee that the consumer's problem is well-behaved. In particular, the assumptions that limx!0 vx(x) = 1, limx!1 vx(x) = 0, and cx(x) = 0 when x = 0 ensure that the sin good demand is strictly positive for any price px < 1 and are made to simplify the exposition. that there is no borrowing or lending, that markets are competitive and that the marginal cost of producing both goods is equal to one, so that the price of each good is also one. 7 Because of the self-control problem ( < 1), the consumers' behavior may not maximize their own welfare, measured by the long-run utility function
Following O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006), we call decision utility the utility function that explains the choice of the agent (u a ), and experienced utility the utility function that re ‡ects the welfare of the agent (u ).
The …rst-best consumption, which we denote by (x ; z ), maximizes the experienced utility In the absence of policy measures aimed at a¤ecting the consumers' behavior, the actual consumption of the sin good, x a , satis…es the …rst order condition v
for any x; x a is larger than x . Moreover, z a = I x a < z : Thus, the agent consumes too much of the sin good and too little of the numeraire.
There are two instruments available to the social planner to correct the consumers'irrational behavior: a linear tax on the consumption of the sin good, and the regulation of the same consumption activity, captured by the parameter 2 [0; ], where = 0 means absence of regulatory measures and = < 1 implies zero sin good consumption. The e¤ect of the tax is to increase the consumer price of the sin good, that becomes p x = 1 + . The e¤ect of regulating the consumption of the sin good is to reduce the immediate bene…t from consuming the sin good.
We now introduce and motivate the two main assumptions of our analysis.
When taxation is imposed, the tax proceeds x are redistributed in a lump sum way to consumers. However, we assume that one euro tax revenues translates in less than one euro transfer for consumers due to the ine¢ ciency of the …scal system. Formally: 7 We assume that I is large relative to the sin good consumption, so as to avoid corner solutions for x:
Assumption 1 (Ine¢ ciency of the tax system) The per-capita transfer l from tax proceeds is given by:
where 2 [0; 1] is the direct ine¢ ciency of the tax system, re ‡ecting the loss in the economy from collecting one euro tax revenues.
In the case of linear tax and lump sum transfer l, the actual consumption maximizes the
The consumption of the sin good satis…es the …rst order condition
Let x ( ) be the agent's consumption rule of the sin good de…ned from condition (3). From the concavity of the utility function, v x c x is decreasing in x. This implies that x( ) is lower than x a and decreasing in . Indeed, the …rst derivative of x( ) with respect is To see why, let us consider the e¤ect of the tax on the sin good. It increases the price of the same and determines a reduction in the demand of both the sin good and the numeraire.
However, there is an income e¤ect due to fact that the proceeds from taxation are transferred
Because of the quasi-linearity of the agent's utility function, this income e¤ect is zero for the sin good (its demand depends only on the relative price) and positive for the numeraire, whose demand increases. It turns out that the extent of such increase depends on the ine¢ ciency of the tax system. The higher the ine¢ ciency, the more the demand of the numeraire is distorted away from the level it would have under an e¢ cient tax system.
This ine¢ ciency may thus prompt for alternative instruments to correct the excess consumption driven by the time-inconsistency. One such instrument is to impose regulatory measures aimed either at creating the conditions for the consumers to voluntarily limit consumption, like information/awareness campaigns, or at directly forbidding the consumption of the sin good through restrictions on the general availability of the good, or on who can consume it. The e¤ect of imposing such measures is to reduce the immediate bene…t from consuming the sin good, which becomes v(x) k(x; ). This is introduced by the following assumption: 8 Assumption 2 (The e¤ ect of regulatory measures) The cost of regulation is given by a continuous function k(x; ) de…ned on < + (0; ] such that:
When regulation is imposed, the agent's experienced utility becomes
and the agent's decision utility becomes
in which we see that reduces the immediate bene…t of consumption.
An increase in has a negative e¤ect both on the level of the utilities (u = u a = k < 0) and on the marginal utilities (u x = u a x = k x < 0). Moreover, to get a strictly positive level of consumption for all 2 (0; ) and zero consumption for = , we introduce the following
and (A3) v xx (x; ) k xx (x; ) < 0 for all x and .
In the case of regulation , the actual consumption, which we denote by (x( ); z( )), maximizes (5) subject to z = I x. Then, the agent's consumption rule of the sin good,
Clearly, z( ) = I x( ). Since regulation reduces the marginal utility of consumption of the sin good and since the utility function is concave, it follows that x( ) is lower than x a and z( ) is higher than z a for any . In this case, unlike what obtains with taxation , the ine¢ ciency does not a¤ect the budget constraint and thus the consumption of the numeraire.
Finally, it is immediate to notice that the optimal sin good consumption is decreasing in .
Indeed, the …rst derivative of x( ) with respect is x ( ) kx (x( ); )
vxx(x( )) kxx(x( ); ) cxx(x( )) , that is negative.
In the case of linear tax , lump sum transfer l and regulation , the actual consumption maximizes the agent's decision utility v (x) k (x; ) c(x) + z subject to the budget constraint z = I +l (1 + ) x. Then, the optimal sin good consumption, x; satis…es the …rst order condition
Clearly, z = I + l (1 + ) x. Since regulation reduces the marginal utility of consumption of the sin good and the marginal utility is decreasing in x, the agent's consumption rule de…ned by (7) is lower than both x( ) and x ( ) :
In the next sections we study the choice problem of the social planner. We …rst focus on the case in which only taxation can be used, then on the case in which there is only regulation, and last we consider the case in which both instruments are available and determine the conditions under which it is optimal to use them both.
Taxing vices
The programme P P j that the social planner solves is to choose the level of taxation that maximizes the experienced utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint z = I + l (1 + ) x, the lump-sum transfer constraint (2) and the consumption rule x ( ) de…ned by condition (3).
By substituting the budget constraint, the lump-sum transfer constraint and the consumption rule in the experienced utility function, the objective function reads as:
The term BT ( ) represents the bene…t of taxation, and is given by the utility that would be obtained by inducing a level of consumption x ( ) x a and there was no ine¢ ciency associated with taxation ( = 0). The second term, CT ( ) ; represents the resources lost due to the ine¢ ciency of taxation, that reduce the consumption of the numeraire. The social planner's problem is to choose^ that maximizes the distance between the bene…ts and costs of taxation.
Proposition 1 states that if is not too high, then the optimal tax,^ , is strictly positive when < 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose that taxation is ine¢ cient ( > 0). Then, if = 1; the optimal tax iŝ = 0; if < 1 and
, the optimal tax is^ > 0.
The above proposition extends O'Donoghue and Rabin's Proposition 1 to the case in which taxation features ine¢ ciencies in terms of administrative and compliance costs. If = 1, there is no con ‡ict of interest between the social planner and the agent about the consumption level of x and the optimal tax is zero. If < 1, the agent's consumption is too large and the optimal tax will be positive as long as the relative ine¢ ciency associated with it is not too large relative to the time inconsistency problem that it wants to correct. To measure the relative ine¢ ciency of taxation we take the ratio between the marginal cost of an increase in tax rate in terms of deadweight loss on each unit of the sin good, x a ; and the marginal bene…t in terms reduced consumption, evaluated in = 0, x (0): 9 The higher the ratio, the higher the ine¢ ciency of the instrument. To measure the time inconsistency problem, we take the di¤erence between the social marginal cost associated to sin good consumption, c x , and the private marginal cost, c x ; again evaluated in = 0. This di¤erence represents a measure of the extent to which the individual underestimates the long term consequences of sin good consumption. As the time inconsistency increases ( falls), the internality associated to sin good consumption increases. When the ine¢ ciency of the instrument is su¢ ciently smaller than the ine¢ ciency induced by the internality problem, it is optimal to impose a tax on the sin good.
To simplify the exposition, we will assume throughout that the condition in Proposition 1 is satis…ed. This is a su¢ cient condition for a maximum.
De…ne with the level of taxation that induces the agent to consume the …rst-best level of the sin good x . This is such that the agent's …rst order condition (3) is satis…ed with equality when x( ) is equal to x , i.e., = (1 )c x (x ). When there is no e¢ ciency loss associated with taxation ( = 0), the social planner's problem (8) simpli…es to maximizing BT ( ) and the optimal tax chosen by the social planner^ coincides with the level . 10 When > 0, the cost component CT ( ) of the social planner's problem (8) is positive and the optimal tax is displaced from its …rst-best level. However, despite what one may think, it will not necessarily be set below the …rst-best. Proposition 2 shows that, when > 0; the optimal tax rate can exceed or fall short of the …rst-best, depending on the elasticity of x ( ) with respect to ; i.e.,
Proposition 2 Assume that is strictly lower than 1 and that ( ) is concave. Then^ Q if and only if x; R 1:
The intuition is the following. When the ine¢ ciency of taxation is strictly positive, the tax has a cost given by the lower consumption of the numeraire, equal to CT ( ) = ^ x (^ ).
The marginal cost of taxation is given by CT = [x ( ) + x ] : This is the result of two opposite e¤ects. A negative direct e¤ect due to the higher price paid on each unit of sin good purchased, which subtracts resources that could have been spent on the numeraire (extraexpenditure e¤ect), and a positive indirect e¤ect due to the reduction in the consumption of the sin good, that frees resources to be used in the numeraire (quantity e¤ect). When the demand is highly elastic ( x; < 1), the quantity e¤ect prevails on the extra-expenditure e¤ect and the marginal cost of taxation is decreasing. Thus, in order to exploit the positive impact that taxation has on the consumption of the numeraire, it is best to set it above the …rst-best level (^ > ). When the demand is inelastic ( x; > 1), the quantity e¤ect is o¤set by the extra-expenditure e¤ect and the marginal cost of taxation is increasing. To mitigate the very negative impact that taxation has on the consumption of the numeraire it is best to set it below the …rst-best (^ < ). Finally, if x; = 1 the optimal tax^ is ; regardless of :
In Proposition 2 we point to the existence of an upward or downward distortion in taxation, relative to the …rst-best, necessary to compensate the negative e¤ect of the ine¢ ciency of taxation. In Proposition 3 we quantify the magnitude of such distortion.
Proposition 3 For all such that^ ^ ( ) is di¤ erentiable, the distance between^ and , j^ j, is zero when = 0 and increases as increases.
taxation BT ( ) is maximum when the agent consumes the …rst-best level of the sin good, x . Indeed, BT = [vx (x( )) cx(x( )) 1] x ( ) is zero when x( ) = x .
The above result can be better understood by considering that, when the elasticity is high, a higher ine¢ ciency implies a higher leakage of resources following a tax increase, thus calling for a larger upward distortion in taxation relative to its …rst-best level to compensate it. When the demand is inelastic, instead, taxation is to be set below the …rst-best. In these circumstances, a higher calls for a larger downward distortion in , so as to have a larger saving in resources (the reduced deadweight loss following the tax decrease) and o¤set the less than proportional increase in the demand of the sin good.
A closed form example
In this section, we extend the example in O'Donoghue and Rabin (2006) to the case in which the tax system is ine¢ cient ( > 0). We assume that the future cost from consumption is linear in the amount consumed, that is c(x) = cx, where c > 0 represents the magnitude of the future health cost relative to the cost of production. We also assume that the utility from consumption, v (x), takes the following functional form:
v (x) = x 1 1 ;
with 0 < < 1. By solving the agent's optimization problem, the demand for the sin good becomes
The …rst-best consumption of the sin good, obtained when = 1 and = 0, is
The …rst-best level of taxation can be obtained by solving x( ) = x ? , and it is equal to
Substituting the consumption rule (10) in (8) , the social welfare function becomes:
with optimal taxation^ = c (1 (1 + )) (1 (1 ) ) ; that is positive whenever < M , with M (1 )c (1+c ) , increasing in the marginal health cost of consumption, c; and increasing in the time inconsistency, 1 :
The example con…rms the results obtained in Proposition 1. First, from (12), we see that there is no taxation if = 1. Moreover,^ is strictly positive whenever there is timeinconsistency ( < 1), and, at = 0; the ine¢ ciency of taxation is not too high relative to the time inconsistency problem that it wants to correct ( < M ), as stated in the inequality in Proposition 1. Finally, if taxation is e¢ cient ( = 0), the optimal tax is strictly positive for any < 1:
Furthermore, depending on the elasticity of x ( ) with respect to ,^ can be either larger or smaller than ; thus con…rming Proposition 2. In particular, x; = (1 + + c) is increasing in so that^ is lower than if is low ( x; < 1), and higher in the opposite case. Consequently, also the optimal level of consumption x (^ ) can be higher or lower than x , depending on the magnitude of .
To see this, suppose for example that = 0:7, c = 2:1 and = 0:2. The …rst-best level of taxation is = 0:63, which corresponds to the …rst-best consumption x L = 0:0019 if = L ; where L = 0:18 ( x; = 1:15), and to x H = 0:24 if = H ; where H = 0:80 ( x; = 0:11). In the …rst case,^ L = 0:65 > , and the optimal consumption is x(^ L ) = 0:0029 < x L . In the second case,^ H = 0:2446 > , and the optimal consumption is x(^ H ) = 0:287 > x H . Last, notice that the distance between^ and is increasing in , as predicted by Proposition 3. Indeed, if 0 = 0:3 > ,^ 0 L = 0:66 >^ L , and^ 0 H = 0:04 <^ H .
Regulating vices
The program P P j that the social planner solves is to choose the level of regulation that maximizes the experienced utility function (4) subject to the budget constraint I x = z and the consumption rule x ( ) de…ned by condition (6) .
By substituting the budget constraint and the consumption rule in the experienced utility function, the latter can be written as the di¤erence between the bene…t and the cost of regulation:
utility that would be obtained by inducing a level of consumption x ( ) < x a if there was no cost associated with regulation. The second term, CR ( ) ; represents the cost induced by the ine¢ ciency of regulation, namely, the reduction in the immediate bene…t of current consumption due to the disutility it generates. The social planner's problem is to choose^ that maximizes the distance between the bene…ts and costs of regulation.
Similar to the case with taxation, to determine whether it is optimal to regulate the consumption of the sin good, we compare the relative ine¢ ciency of the regulatory instrument with the internality that it aims to correct. To measure the relative ine¢ ciency of the regulatory instrument we consider the ratio between the marginal cost, k ; and the marginal bene…t of regulation, x : the higher the ratio, the more ine¢ cient the instrument. The internality associated to sin good consumption is again measured by the di¤erence between the social marginal cost associated to sin good consumption, c x ; and the private marginal cost, c x :
Proposition 4 states that if at = 0 the relative ine¢ ciency of the regulatory instrument is lower than the internality due to the time inconsistency problem, then the optimal regulation, , is strictly positive.
Proposition 4 Suppose that regulation is costly (k > 0). Then, if = 1, the optimal regulation is^ = 0; if < 1 and k (x a ; 0) jx (0)j < (1 )c x (x a ), the optimal regulation is^ 2 (0; ).
If
= 1, there is no con ‡ict of interest between the social planner and the agent about the consumption level of x and the optimal regulation is zero. If < 1, instead, the agent's consumption is too high and the optimal regulation will be positive as long as the ine¢ ciency of regulation is not too high relative to the time inconsistency problem that it wants to correct.
As for the case with taxation, the bene…t from regulation is maximum when the agent consumes the …rst-best level of the sin good, x . 11 De…ne the …rst-best regulation as the level that induces the agent to consume x , and denote it by . 12 Since regulation is costly, one may be induced to think that the social planner will set it to a level below the …rst-best. This is not always the case. To see why, consider that an increase in has two e¤ects on the disutility of regulation: a positive indirect e¤ect due to the reduction of the actual immediate bene…t from consuming the sin good, k x x < 0; and a negative direct e¤ect, k > 0. If the positive indirect e¤ect prevails on the negative direct one, the disutility of regulation is decreasing and the regulation level that maximizes the distance between the bene…ts and costs of regulation is larger than .
Proposition 5 Assume that is strictly lower than 1 and that ( ) is concave. Then^ if and only if
The left hand side of (15) represents the relative ine¢ ciency of the regulatory instrument in the …rst-best. The right hand side of (15) measures the internality due to the time inconsistency problem, again in the …rst-best.
Proposition 5 has implications on the levels of consumption. Indeed, since x( ) is decreasing in , x (^ ) can be higher or lower than x depending on whether^ is higher or lower than the …rst-best level. Thus, regulation may exceed or fall short of the …rst-best level according to how rapidly the direct cost of regulation increases relative to its bene…t.
A closed form example
In this section, we modify the above example assuming that the only instrument available to a¤ect the consumption of the sin good is regulation. In particular, the utility from consumption, v (x) k (x; ), takes the following functional form:
(1 )
with 0 < < 1, k > 0, and 0 1. By solving the agent's optimization problem, the demand for the sin good becomes
The …rst-best level of regulation can be obtained by solving x( ) = x , where x is de…ned in Eq. (11) , and is equal to
Substituting the consumption rule (16) in (14), the social welfare function becomes:
1 . If strictly positive, the optimal regulation^ can be obtained by solving the …rst order condition, and it is equal to 13
increasing in the time inconsistency, 1 :
The example con…rms the results obtained in Proposition 4. First, from (17), we see that there is no regulation if = 1. Moreover, from simple algebra,^ is strictly positive whenever there is time-inconsistency ( < 1), and at = 0 the ine¢ ciency of regulation is not too high relative to the time inconsistency problem that it wants to correct (i.e., k < k M , with k M ),
as stated in Proposition 4.
Furthermore, depending on the value of parameters,^ can be either larger or smaller than ; thus con…rming Proposition 5. In particular, it is lower than if k is high, and higher in the opposite case. Consequently, also the optimal level of consumption x (^ ) can be higher or lower than x , depending on the magnitude of the regulation cost. To see this, suppose that = 0:2, = 0:7; c = 2:1. The …rst-best level of regulation is = 0:2032, which corresponds to the …rst-best consumption x = 0:0035. If the regulation cost is small, say k = k L ; where k L = 0:00007, then^ k L = 0:4377 > , and the optimal consumption is x(^ k L ) = 0:0006 < x .
But, if the regulation cost is high, say k = k H ; where k H = 0:0006, then^ k H = 0:026 < , and the optimal consumption is x(^ k H ) = 0:0095 > x .
Taxing and regulating vices
The problem P P j ; that the social planner solves is to choose the consumption bundle (x; z); the level of tax and the level of regulation that maximizes the experienced utility function (4) subject to the budget constraint z = I + l (1 + ) x, the lump-sum transfer constraint (2) and the consumption rule de…ned by condition (7) .
By substituting the budget constraint and the lump-sum transfer constraint in the objective function, the latter reads as:
For any sin good consumption level x; and policy pair ( ; ) implementing x, the term in square brackets represents the bene…t of consumption, B (x). The second term, C (x; ) ; represents the cost of taxation, while the third term, C (x; ) ; represents the cost of regulation.
Solving the social planner maximization problem is a complex task that requires several technical and unintuitive assumptions, given that the problem might not be quasi-concave.
We will therefore simplify the analysis by focusing on the problem of choice of the optimal taxation and regulation policy (~ (x) ;~ (x)) that minimizes the social cost of inducing a level of consumption of the sin good x x a ; de…ned by Eq. (7), i.e., 14 (~ (x) ;~ (x)) arg min
Notice that the objective function in (19) can be interpreted as an isocost function, i.e., the set of all policy combinations generating equal cost, while the constraint can be interpreted as an isoquant, that is the set of all possible combinations of policies that induce the agent to consume the level x of sin good. 15 For the problem to be well-behaved, we assume that the e¤ect of regulation on the agent's level of experienced utility is decreasing in (u = k < 0), and that the e¤ect of regulation on the agent's marginal decision utility is increasing in (u a x = k x > 0). These assumptions imply that the isocost curves are decreasing and concave, while the isoquant is decreasing and convex.
In the ; plane, the solution (~ (x) ;~ (x)) of the social planner minimization problem lies on the isocost curve that intersects the isoquant closest to the origin.
Denote by^ (x) and^ (x) respectively the level of taxation and regulation needed to induce the consumption x when only one instrument is used, that is^ (x) solving the isoquant constraint when = 0; and^ (x) solving the same constraint when = 0.
An interior solution obtains when the isocost closest to the origin is tangent to the isoquant, i.e., when k (x; (x)) x = k x (x; (x)) :
A corner solution with = 0 obtains when the slope of the isocost closest to the origin is higher than the slope of the isoquant, i.e., when
This allows us to de…ne a lower bound for below which only taxation is used, L (x)
k (x; 0) = (xk x (x; 0)) :
Last, a corner solution with = 0 obtains when the slope of the isocost closest to the origin is lower than the slope of the isoquant, i.e., when
This allows us to de…ne an upper bound for above which only regulation is used, H (x)
k (x;^ (x)) = (xk x (x;^ (x))) :
From the above, Proposition 6 can be derived.
Proposition 6 Assume that is strictly lower than 1 and that the social planner cost minimization problem is well-behaved. Then, for any x 2 (0; x a ] ; if
1.
H (x) only regulation is used by the social planner and =^ (x);
2. L (x) < < H (x) ; taxation and regulation are both used by the social planner are both smaller than the levels that would be used when each instrument is used in isolation;
3.
L (x) only taxation is used by the social planner and =^ (x) :
From Proposition 6 it follows that, depending on the cost of taxation, di¤erent scenarios can arise. For su¢ ciently low ( < L (x)), the regulator uses only taxation, as the ine¢ ciency of taxation is not too high to justify the use of regulation. As increases ( L (x)
there is an interval of values of in which the regulators prefers to introduce regulation. This is because the ine¢ ciency of taxation is such that the regulator may save on these costs by using regulation. As increases beyond H (x), the ine¢ ciency of taxation is so high that the regulator prefers to give up taxation altogether and use only regulation.
A closed form example
We now modify the previous examples assuming that both taxation and regulation may be used to a¤ect the consumption of the sin good. We develop a numerical example to illustrate the results of the cost minimization problem (19) and to derive the full characterization of the social planner maximization problem. The utility from consumption, v (x) k (x; ), takes the following functional form:
where A > 0, > 1, and the future cost from consumption is quadratic in the amount consumed, that is c(x) = cx 2 , where c > 0. 16 Using these functional forms, the cost of taxation is
CT (x; ) = x, while the cost of regulation is CR (x; ) = x + k : The isoquant constraint in programme (19) , i.e., the set of all possible combinations of policies that induce the agent to consume the level x < x a ; is given by 17 Ax + (1 ) All our main assumptions are satis…ed for 2 [0; 1] and x low enough. 1 7 x a is obtained by solving Ax + x 1 2 cx 1 = 0. 1 8 The interior value of the policies is given by (x) = x 1 (1 + 2 cx Ax )
To conclude, assume that = 0:35 and analyze the social planner maximization problem.
for all x 0:5732. Therefore, for all x 0:5732, the minimum cost function, (x), can be obtained by substituting (x) and (x) in CT (x; ) + CR (x; ), and is given by 
Discussion and conclusion
We have studied the optimal sin taxes and regulatory measures that a social planner wants to implement when consumers are time-inconsistent. There is an ine¢ ciency associated with regulation, in terms of the disutility it generates on consumption, and an ine¢ ciency associated with taxation, in terms of administrative, collection and compliance costs. We …nd that both instruments should be used, provided the ine¢ ciency associated with either is not too high.
We thus provide a theory that rationalizes the widespread evidence of the joint use of taxation Nestle (2012) , the reason for the tax drop was to appease business interests. 19 Finally, since our model can be seen as a normative rather than a positive theory of taxing and regulating vices, it is an empirical issue to verify how much e¢ ciency considerations are the driving force of the legislators action. To verify the extent to which these considerations are central to the government action, one could test whether countries with more ine¢ cient tax systems ( high) rely more heavily on regulatory instruments relative to those with more e¢ cient tax systems ( low). Alternatively, for given tax systems ( given), one could compare di¤erent interventions aimed at a¤ecting the consumption of di¤erent sin goods. We leave the empirical veri…cation of these predictions to future research.
Proof of Proposition 1. We will …rst prove that if = 1 the optimal tax is 0, and then we will show that if < 1 and is small, it is strictly positive. For all 0, as long as v and c are thrice di¤erentiable, ( ) is continuous and twice di¤erentiable. If strictly positive,^ satis…es the …rst order condition
From (3) we derive x ( ) = (1 ) (1 )c x (x( )). If = 1, @ =@ = (1 )x ( ) x( ) < 0 for all 0, and so the optimal tax is the corner solution^ = 0. Suppose instead < 1. In this case, ( ) may not be quasiconcave. However, when = 0,
. Hence, = 0 cannot be a corner solution of the social planner maximization problem. Moreover, Inada conditions for v(x) together with c x (0) = 0 imply lim !1 x( ) = 0 and lim !1 (@ =@ ) = 1. Hence, by continuity of ( ), there exists at least one^ > 0 satisfying condition (20) .
Proof of Proposition 2. The …rst order condition (20) can be written as
[v x (x(^ )) c x (x(^ ) 1] = ^ 1
x;
where x; = x (^ )^ x(^ ) . Since x ( ) < 0, the right-hand side of (21) equals 0 i¤ x; = 1, is positive i¤ x; < 1 and negative in the opposite case. The left-hand side of (21) equals 0 i¤ = , is positive i¤ > and negative in the opposite case.
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume = 0. Substituting in (20) gives d =d = x ( )x ( ) = 0, with x ( ) = (1 )c x (x( )). Since = (1 )c x (x( )), then d ( )=d = 0 and^ = .
Assume > 0. The derivative of j^ j with respect to is @j^ j @ = @^ @ sgn(^ ):
By the envelope theorem,
The denominator is negative by the local concavity of the objective function into a neighborhood of^ . Then @^ =@ 0 i¤ x(^ ) +^ x (^ )) 0: Moreover, since x(^ ) +^ x (^ )) 0 i¤ x; < 1, by Proposition 2 @^ =@ 0 i¤^ is larger than : Hence, sgn(@^ =@ ) = sgn(^ ) and the derivative of the absolute value of the distance between^ and is always positive.
Proof of Proposition 4. We will …rst prove that if = 1 the optimal regulation is 0, and then we will show that if < 1 and k (x a ; 0)= jx (0)j < (1 )c x (x a ), it is strictly positive. Thus,^ = 0. Suppose instead < 1. In this case, ( ) may not be quasi-concave.
However, when = 0, @ =@ = (1 )c x (x a )x (0) k (x a ; 0), which is positive whenever k (x a ; 0)= jx (0)j < (1 )c x (x a ). Hence, = 0 cannot be a corner solution of the social planner maximization problem. Moreover, Assumptions (A2) and (A3) together with c x (0) = 0 imply that when = , @ =@ < 0 for all x. Hence, by continuity of ( ), there exists at least onê 2 (0; ) satisfying condition (22) .
Proof of Proposition 5. Let be CR ( ) = k x (x ( ) ; ) x + k (x ( ) ; ) and assume that < 1 and @ 2 =@ 2 0. We will prove the proposition in two steps. In the …rst step we will show that k (x ; )= jx ( )j < (1 )c x (x ) if and only if CR ( ) is positive. In the second step we will prove that^ < if and only if CR ( ) is positive.
Step 1. k (x ; )= jx ( )j < (1 )c x (x ) , CR ( ) > 0 : From condition (6), Step 2. CR ( ) > 0 ,^ < : To prove the step we will …rst show that CR ( ) > 0 implies^ < , and then we will prove that if^ < then C ( ) > 0. Assume 
and~ (x) =^ (x) k x (x;~ (x)) ;
A solution for problem (24) always exists since the objective function is convex ( xk x +k > 0 by assumption) and the constraint is a compact set. A necessary and su¢ cient condition for an interior solution is xk x (x; ) + k (x; ) = 0:
Then, if L (x), @ ( )=@ 0 for all , and~ (x) = 0 and~ (x) =^ (x); if L (x) < < H (x), @ ( )=@ < 0 at = 0 and @ ( )=@ > 0 at =^ (x), and the optimal policy is~ (x) 2 (0;^ (x)) satisfying condition (26) and~ 2 (0;^ (x)) given by condition (25); if H (x), @ ( )=@ 0 for all , and~ (x) =^ (x) and~ (x) = 0.
